Collective Delusion: A Critical Look at Protest Efficacy Through the Lens of Decision Making
The Common Narrative Around Protests
Protests, regardless of their success, are driven by the belief that collective action can lead to meaningful change. The common narrative surrounding protests is that they either lead to the forceful suppression of the protesters by the defenders of the status quo (e.g., police brutality), depletion of resources to organize the protest, or a change in the status quo. In all three scenarios, the belief is that protests are a form of action that leads to a reaction from the defenders of the status quo. In all cases, the protesters pose a substantial threat to the defenders. Thus, based on one’s justified belief that the status quo should be changed, it follows that one has an incentive to contribute to a protest because there is a chance that it will cause change.
Nevertheless, after taking a closer look, it becomes evident that protests can be a deceptive tool that does not always pose a tangible threat to the status quo. Individuals want to reduce uncertainty and feel that they are in charge. However, this belief causes confirmation bias, making people overestimate the power of protests, thus leading to self-deception. This deception can help overcome a collective action problem by mobilizing the masses to achieve true change in the status quo. Yet, it can also allow defenders of the status quo to make protesters think they have reached their objective, thus reducing pressure on themselves while keeping the status quo unchanged. Furthermore, some protests are even beneficial for the defenders of the status quo. Additionally, protests can often help defenders demonstrate their ruling power and fortify the status quo by suppressing them.
This essay shows that while protests are commonly seen as direct threats to the status quo capable of instigating change, they often operate in a complex and ambiguous context in which their actual impact can range from significant change to merely symbolic participation. The essay identifies four types of protests: effective protests, suppressed protests, symbolic participation protests, and semi-staged protests, illustrating how various factors influence their outcomes.
Do Protests Really Have the Power to Change the Status Quo?
Despite the common belief that protests pose a substantial threat to the status quo, there are many challenges that interest groups face when striving for change in the status quo. The difficulty of cooperation among large groups, often due to conflicting interests that discourage joint action, is commonly known as the collective action problem. The collective action problem is the key challenge protesters face when striving for change in the status quo. The root of the problem is that if the contributors reach their collective goal, every member of the group enjoys its benefits, whether or not they contributed to its achievement. These benefits are called non-excludable goods.
There are four variables that help us model collective action:
N is the number of group members (individuals who will benefit from group achievement). The higher this number gets, the more difficult it becomes to reach an objective. This is due to the fact that individuals in larger groups become anonymous, which makes it more difficult for them to be held accountable if they don’t contribute. Additionally, the higher this number is, the less each individual believes that their contribution will make a difference, which disincentivizes them from contributing.
k is the fraction of members of the group needed to contribute to reach a collective goal. The higher k is, the more pressured every individual is to contribute because they know that their contribution is needed to achieve the collective goal and receive the benefit. There is an exception when k is so small that it reaches a minimum number of individuals present in any group who will “always do the right thing” based on their values, putting their utility maximization aside.
B is the benefit each member of the group receives if the goal is reached. It has a positive relationship with the likelihood of contribution.
C is the cost each individual incurs if they contribute towards the common goal. It has a negative relationship with the likelihood of contribution.
Many protests that would pose a substantial threat to the status quo would need to occur on a national level. This implies a large N, which decreases the probability that the collective goal will be reached.
Furthermore, I will model the collective action problem in different scenarios by varying the values of the variables. Despite the collective action problem, many individuals partake in protests and achieve their goals. Mancur Olson introduces the Byproduct Theory, which provides a solution to the problem of non-excludable goods. Interest groups need to find ways to offer something to the contributors that non-contributors don’t receive. These can be various kinds of benefits, from a free gym pass to a positive experience of an amazing atmosphere at a protest. Thus, the collective goal is only a byproduct of an overall beneficial activity. Secondly, Richard E. Wagner introduces the theory of Political Entrepreneurs. Wagner claims that political entrepreneurs see a prospective cooperation dividend that is currently not being enjoyed, and they bear the costs of organizing, expend effort to monitor individuals for slack behavior, and sometimes even impose punishment on slackers. This acts as a third-party enforcer in a cooperative scenario and compels all members of the group to contribute towards a common goal.
Four Types of Protests
Based on these theoretical foundations, I identify four types of protests according to their ability to pose a threat to the status quo and their potential to effect substantial change. This section of the paper focuses on specific changes in the status quo, such as shifts in the political system or significant political agendas. While I acknowledge that there will be exceptions to these four categories, I argue that most protests fit within this framework. Therefore, it is important to examine how these models function and how they align with empirical evidence of protest outcomes.
Firstly, I categorize protest types based on whether countermeasures were taken against them to preserve the status quo. Secondly, I divide them based on the outcome—whether or not they reached their collective goal and changed the status quo. For the sake of the model, I have made the outcome binary (Change or No Change), although I recognize that, in most cases, the outcome is continuous. I further assume that countermeasures taken against protesters indicate that the protests pose a significant threat to the status quo.
The four types of protests are categorized in the table below:
Now let’s see how the collective action problem and By-product and Political Entrepreneurs theories play out in each of these scenarios.
1) Effective Protests
The combination of these values for each variable represents an effective protest that overcomes the collective action problem and reaches a change in the status quo.
2) Suppressed Protests
The table of variables for this type of protests is identical with the one for successful protests. This means that even though the group had good conditions for overcoming the collective action problem the defenders made the costs so high (for example extreme police brutality) that the costs rose and in the end C>B and the defenders eventually suppressed the protests.
3) Symbolic Participation Protests
In this case the combination of high k and very low B makes these protests very ineffective in reaching their collective objectives. The explanation for these protests is very accurately provided by Olson’s Byproduct Theory
4) Semi-staged Protests
The Velvet Revolution case is a bit unusual because, when we look at the variables, it seems most likely for a change in the status quo to occur. Nevertheless, this is primarily due to the low C in this scenario. The low C arises from the fact that the defenders of the status quo are already prepared for the staged change in the status quo and have plans to reinstitute the old dynamics in the “new system.” This was the case in most revolutions in the Soviet satellites after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in many Soviet republics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the context of Central Europe, voucher privatization was used to reinstate the old power dynamics, ensuring that the elites in the old system remained the elites in the new system, which I define as a non-change of the status quo. Similarly, in the post-Soviet republics, the old political elites became the new oligarchs, thereby becoming the economic and political elites in the new system. I find this type of protest especially interesting, as modeling doesn’t tell us much about the true instrumental nature of these protests in favor of the defenders of the status quo.
Conclusion
To conclude, contrary to the popular narrative, protests are not always a face-to-face battle between the protesters and the defenders of the status quo. Instead, protests often occur in a gray area. Firstly, they can be symbolic and not threatening to the status quo. Secondly, they may seem successful at changing the status quo but, in reality, fail to achieve their true ideological objectives. Further research is needed to quantify the prevalence of these four types of protests and to identify strategies that enhance their effectiveness in bringing about substantial changes to the status quo.
References
To conclude, contrary to the popular narrative, protests are not always a face-to-face battle between the protesters and the defenders of the status quo. Instead, protests often occur in a gray area. Firstly, they can be symbolic and not threatening to the status quo. Secondly, they may seem successful at changing the status quo but, in reality, fail to achieve their true ideological objectives. Further research is needed to quantify the prevalence of these four types of protests and to identify strategies that enhance their effectiveness in bringing about substantial changes to the status quo.
[1] Ruud Wouters, “The Persuasive Power of Protest. How Protest Wins Public Support,” November 3, 2018.
[2] Dunya van Troost, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, and Bert Klandermans, “Emotions of Protest,” in Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension, ed. Nicolas Demertzis (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013), 186–203, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025661_10.
[3] Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Penguin Psychology (London: Penguin Books, 2012)., page 119
[4] Donatella della Porta, “Protests as Critical Junctures: Some Reflections towards a Momentous Approach to Social Movements,” Social Movement Studies 19, no. 5–6 (November 1, 2020): 556–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1555458. page 9
[5] Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, Second edition, The New Institutionalism in American Politics (New York London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010).page 268
[6] Mancur Olson, “Some Social and Political Implications of Economic Development,” 1965.
[7] van Troost, van Stekelenburg, and Klandermans, “Emotions of Protest.”
[8] Shepsle, Analyzing Politics.page 284
[9] Shepsle.page 288
[10] Raul Lejano et al., “Collective Action as Narrativity and Praxis: Theory and Application to Hong Kong’s Urban Protest Movements,” Public Policy and Administration 33, no. 3 (July 2018): 260–89, https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076717699262.
[11] Katia Hristova, “Czech Voucher Privatization: A Case of Decision Making Under Uncertainty,” University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2002), https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol7/iss1/5.
[12] Pavel Mertlík, “Czech Privatization: From Public Ownership to Public Ownership in Five Years?,” Eastern European Economics 35, no. 2 (1997): 64–83.
[13] Rosaria Puglisi, “The Rise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs,” Democratization 10, no. 3 (August 2003): 99–123, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340312331293947.
Bibliography:
Hristova, Katia. “Czech Voucher Privatization: A Case of Decision Making Under Uncertainty.” University Avenue Undergraduate Journal of Economics 7, no. 1 (January 1, 2002). https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje/vol7/iss1/5.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Penguin Psychology. London: Penguin Books, 2012.
Lejano, Raul, Ernest Chui, Timothy Lam, and Jovial Wong. “Collective Action as Narrativity and Praxis: Theory and Application to Hong Kong’s Urban Protest Movements.” Public Policy and Administration 33, no. 3 (July 2018): 260–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0952076717699262.
Mancur Olson. “Some Social and Political Implications of Economic Development,” 1965.
Mertlík, Pavel. “Czech Privatization: From Public Ownership to Public Ownership in Five Years?” Eastern European Economics 35, no. 2 (1997): 64–83.
Porta, Donatella della. “Protests as Critical Junctures: Some Reflections towards a Momentous Approach to Social Movements.” Social Movement Studies 19, no. 5–6 (November 1, 2020): 556–75. https://doi.org/10.1080/14742837.2018.1555458.
Puglisi, Rosaria. “The Rise of the Ukrainian Oligarchs.” Democratization 10, no. 3 (August 2003): 99–123. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340312331293947.
Ruud Wouters. “The Persuasive Power of Protest. How Protest Wins Public Support,” November 3, 2018.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. Second edition. The New Institutionalism in American Politics. New York London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2010.
Troost, Dunya van, Jacquelien van Stekelenburg, and Bert Klandermans. “Emotions of Protest.” In Emotions in Politics: The Affect Dimension in Political Tension, edited by Nicolas Demertzis, 186–203. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137025661_10.
