Degrowth Ideals and Effective Decarbonization Strategies
Why degrowth is not politically feasible and how this dream keeps us from effective policy towards decarbonization.
Based on course on Advanced Political Economy by Anar Ahmadov
Read: https://degrowth.info/library/the-illusion-of-degrowth-in-a-poor-and-unequal-world
The blog discussion between Branko Milanović and Jason Hickel on degrowth brings up some interesting insights into the notion of degrowth by two highly influential academics who both agree that decarbonization is needed yet disagree on how it should be achieved.
This blog will outline the key arguments of the two authors on degrowth and evaluate the feasibility of their ideas in terms of policy implementation.
Summary of The Debate
Milanovic interprets degrowth as ‘fixing global GDP at its current level’. He argues that if we were to do that, “then, unless we change the distribution of income, we are condemning about 15 percent of the world population to permanent abject poverty.”
Because of the evident ethical issues associated with doing that, it follows that one of the main objectives of degrowth would have to be global wealth redistribution.
Milanovic furthermore demonstrates that global wealth redistribution would mean millions, particularly of people in Western countries, getting poorer, and concludes that the objective would not find political support.
Hickel responds to Milanovic’s argument with four main arguments:
Degrowth is not about GDP but about availability of resources and their management. It focuses on finding sectors that are energy-demanding and moving toward sectors that are more energy-efficient—maintaining the same GDP but with less resource use.
GDP is an inaccurate measure of human well-being.
It is not the income per se, but the welfare purchasing power of that income, that determines well-being (If education and healthcare are provided by the state using taxpayers' money, and the forest behind their house offers them peace of mind, their quality of life will be higher than that of someone with a higher income who does not have access to those resources).
We can already see a shift from a consumerist lifestyle toward a more sustainable and minimalist model of living, giving us hope that in a well-functioning democracy with limited corporate power, there would be a political demand for degrowth.
Milanovic replies by pinpointing the low practicability of a project at a scale such as global wealth redistribution proposed by Hickel.
He agrees that GDP per capita is not a sufficient condition for well-being, but argues it is certainly a good indicator of it. People in Portugal might have a better life than U.S. citizens, but when looking at most developing countries compared to the Global North, the impact of GDP per capita on quality of living is indisputable).
Lastly, Milanovic undermines the assumption that people want to move toward a less consumerist lifestyle, referencing the average citizen waking up at 4 a.m. on Black Friday to buy “stuff.
Hickel once more expresses his belief in humanity as not inherently consumeristic and emphasizes the need for democratic decision-making as a way to stop our “self-destruction” in the form of emissions.
Milanovic's Arguments Appear to Be More Supported by Current Events
Reading this debate in 2025, after a three-year armed conflict in Europe and after Donald Trump adopted highly protectionist trade policies, I must disagree with Hickel’s belief in global degrowth and global wealth redistribution through a grassroots movement.
Hickel’s way of thinking, in my opinion, showcases the optimistic and globalist approach to policy making that the Western world seemed to believe in for a short period, approximately from 2015 to 2022.
Unfortunately for our civilization, we don’t seem to be at a level where collective action on a planetary scale would be possible.
Instead, recent events teach us that we are much closer to ape troops than we are to a global government capable of effectively dealing with issues like climate change. By “effectively,” I mean on the scale that Hickel is discussing, where the justified belief of each individual turns into a group agenda that translates into policy, such as global redistribution of wealth.
Decarbonization without degrowth
Isn’t it better to shoot for the stars and end up on the Moon than being too reserved and hesitant from the very beginning?
I see the danger in the “illusion of degrowth,” as Milanovic calls it, in that grand ideas like this might inhibit our ability to think realistically and, therefore, to act at all. Even though this process might be too slow given the environmental crisis we are facing, it might be the only feasible way to go.
Anar Ahmadov paraphrased Pierre Bourdieu, saying, “Our task is to know the science of probability to understand what’s possible and act upon it.”
Milanovic proposes one plausible—politically realistic—contribution to decarbonization: reducing the growth of energy-intensive sectors through taxation. While this preventive measure might not be even near sufficient, it is a realistic one that—unlike global direct democracy and wealth redistribution—can be seriously considered by policymakers tomorrow.
